From Tafsīr to Takfīr: When Differences in Interpretation are Regarded as Differences in Creed in the Literalism of the Divine Names and Attributes

Abstract

Debates over asmāʾ wa ṣifāt (divine names and attributes) have produced lasting differences in Islamic theological interpretation, particularly over terms such as istiwāʾ, yad, and wajh. A problem arises when such differences are no longer treated as legitimate disagreement but become grounds for defining orthodoxy, deviation, and, in some cases, takfīr. This study aims to clarify how semantic reduction in tafsīr discourse may contribute to religious exclusion and how literalist hermeneutics relates to exclusive interpretive authority. It employs a qualitative conceptual-documentary design based on close reading and analytical synthesis of scholarly literature and one official document, the Qur’an translation guideline of the Lajnah Pentashihan Mushaf Al-Qur’an. The analysis combines semantic–pragmatic analysis, philosophical and contextual hermeneutics, and Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power. The analysis suggests that literal interpretation does not in itself constitute takfīr. Exclusion becomes possible when one interpretation is positioned as the sole criterion of theological legitimacy and alternative readings are characterized as deviant. The study distinguishes four forms of judgment: criticism of an interpretation, the judgment that it is incorrect, the labeling of it or its adherents as deviant, and explicit takfīr. It concludes that the movement from disagreement to exclusion is conditional rather than automatic, shaped by interpretive authority and the construction of boundaries of legitimate belief. As the study does not analyze primary texts or digital discourse directly, it offers a mechanism to be tested in future research.